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ABSTRACT 
 
Cognitive and social-emotional development have clear markers for individual progress through 
sequenced patterns of change.  These markers define stages for the individual maturation 
process.  The use of groups of learners to enhance pedagogical success does not take account of 
these patterned markers of maturity.  In addition, interaction processes in groups structure the 
patterns of who talks and who listens in the group.  Such differential levels of activity affect who 
learns how much in the group.  The extent to which individual development affects levels of 
participation is the focus of this paper.  We review the research on development and interaction 
inequality, describe a coding scheme for identifying levels of cognitive behavior (development), 
and examine the extent to which cognitive behavior developmental differences are correlated 
with the emergence of inequality in task groups charged with learning tasks.  Data analyzed for 
this project were collected in groups composed of undergraduate and graduate students.Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 10, No. 3)  (Shelly & Shelly) 
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Working in groups with peers is espoused as an effective strategy to increase student success at 
mastering cognitive content, developing social skills, and improving academic skills for students 
at all levels of education.  The practice involves assembling groups of students, giving the group 
a task to accomplish, providing resources and guidance on how to proceed, and monitoring the 
activity as they work to solve the problem.   
 
What is of note to us is the fact that so little research has examined the extent to which this 
approach has the desired consequences for students across developmental levels.  Research on 
interaction in task groups, the group type employed in learning exercises, has a robust set of 
findings and theory that shows that inequality always emerges when groups work together.  This 
inequality patterns who talks and who listens, and presumably, who learns. 
 
Cognitive markers for individual progress across boundaries in cognitive development are well 
known.  Children learn conservation of number as they become pre-operational, conversation of 
volume as they move to concrete operations, and symbolic/logical reasoning as they enter formal 
operations.  Similarly, some adults learn to synthesize, create, and assess new information.  
Social (emotional) development has similar markers for transitions as individuals develop.  
Egocentric orientations change, confidence in interaction increases, and interaction styles change 
as a consequence of maturation. 
 
Research linking development levels to interaction in task groups is virtually non existent. 
Differences in cognitive development may affect the emergence of inequality in groups if 
members of the group are at different cognitive development levels.  The same consequences 
may occur if members are at different social (emotional) development levels.  We do not know 
whether the dynamics of interaction, the mechanism by which inequality emerges, varies by 
developmental levels of group members.  This paper addresses how to integrate these two 
strands of research to examine learning environments.  In the process, we hope to be able to 
contribute to our understanding of social interaction and individual development. 
 
As we began to examine the research on social inequality in student learning groups, we were 
struck by three points.  First, most of the studies are carried out in middle school classrooms with 
children between the ages of ten and thirteen .  Second, amelioration of social inequality is the 
focus of much of this work to the exclusion of discussion of differences in behavior that result 
from developmental differences for children at this age (cf. Cohen and Lotan 1995 and Chizik, et 
al. 2003).  Third, little attention has been paid to social and emotional development as it affects 
interaction in learning groups.  This paper presents one approach to an empirical examination of 
issues of social inequality and cognitive development.  We defer consideration of social and 
emotional development to later work.  
 
We first develop a brief review of the principal findings relating to inequality processes in 
groups, both in the general sense and in their specific application in pedagogical contexts.  The 
next section of the paper reviews research on individual development.  This is followed by a 
brief review of group learning research.  Issues identified in these reviews are highlighted and a Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 10, No. 3)  (Shelly & Shelly) 
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research program to address them is sketched.  Data collected in groups is analyzed to determine 
the extent to which development and interaction dynamics affect learning and interaction.  We 
conclude the paper with a discussion of implications for learning in groups of integrating the 
strands of research on inequality in task groups and cognitive and social development. 
 
INEQUALITY IN TASK GROUPS 
 
The study of inequality in task groups has a long history in social psychology.  Its original 
development focused on groups of individuals who begin their interaction together as social 
equals.  The research resulted in identification of emergent properties of interaction that reflect 
differential contributions to joint outcomes observed by researchers and recognized by group 
members.  Subsequent research demonstrated similar effects in groups composed of individuals 
with varying social attributes.  Beginning with the identification of performance expectation 
states, the explanation of inequality in task groups has developed tools to explain and expand our 
understanding of these processes (cf. Webster 2003). 
 
Four fundamental issues are addressed by research in the expectation states tradition.  First, how 
do individuals who begin working together as social equals evolve patterns of inequality 
recognized by external observers as well as the group members?  Berger (1958, Berger and 
Conner 1969) first addressed this problem and was able to articulate a sequence of interaction 
including socially distributed chances to contribute to the group task, evaluations of these 
contributions, and the exercise of influence.  Aggregation of these experiences by each group 
member leads to expectations for future performance which become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
Fisek and Ofshe (1970) show that interaction differences observed by researchers were reflected 
in assessments group members made of contributions to solving the group task, including 
themselves.  This process occurs very rapidly, even in groups of strangers who are initial social 
equals (Shelly and Troyer 2001).  These differences lead to a pattern of interaction in which 
advantaged members of the group, those expected to perform better at the task, talk more, make 
more contributions to task solutions, and are more influential in organizing the group and 
producing a task outcome.  Individuals who are disadvantaged, those expected to perform poorly 
at the task, talk less, react to the suggestions of advantaged members, and are less influential. 
 
Secondly, what is the role of culturally defined social inequality in the organization of activity in 
groups?  Strodtbeck, James, and Hawkins (1957) showed that group members pattern interaction 
based on social differences members bring with them as they enter a group.  Differences based 
on occupation, age, education, race, appearance, and gender have been identified as creating 
behavioral differences in task groups.  Early demonstration of these effects focused on the 
exercise of influence in a joint decision making task in which members of the group believed 
they had higher or lower educational status than their partner (Moore 1968) or higher or lower 
military rank than their partner (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch 1972).  Status characteristics valued 
by the larger society, and their associated performance expectations, are reflected in open 
interaction in task groups as well.    The combination of status information to form aggregated 
expectation states proceeds according to a combination principle in which all positive Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 10, No. 3)  (Shelly & Shelly) 
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information is assembled, all negative information is assembled and an aggregated state emerges 
for self and other (Berger, et al. 1992). 
 
Third, how do group members come to know the relative standing of one another during an 
interaction?  This occurs when group members give off cues that explicitly place them 
(indicative cues, e.g. "I know because I am an attorney."), or implicitly locate them (expressive 
cues, e.g. an accent or posture) in a particular location in the status system of society.  Such cues 
also make claims about task skills or category membership.  Thus, information sent and received 
in the course of conversation is the mechanism by which group members transmit knowledge of 
their relative standing in socially heterogeneous groups (Berger, et al. 1986, Ridgeway, Berger 
and Smith 1986). 
 
The fourth issue of interest to us is the behavior observed by researchers who study group 
activity.  Five abstract elements of interaction are of interest.  The provision of opportunities for 
others to contribute, the contributions those individuals make, the positive and negative reception 
of contributions, and the exercise of influence constitute the observable activity in the in group 
interaction.  The aggregation of this information is referred to as the observable power and 
prestige order of the group.  Recent studies have shown that a number of different measures of 
this observable ordering are highly reliable and correlated with one another (cf. Shelly and 
Troyer 2001). 
 
DEVELOPM,ENTAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ACTIONS 
 
Piaget's studies of cognitive development (Piaget and Inhelder 1969, Flavell 1963, Forman and 
Sigel 1979, Sund 1976) demonstrated that children think qualitatively differently at different 
ages.  The developmental differences have been validated and extended by other cognitive 
psychologists.  Since we are interested in verbal expressions characteristic of learning in more 
advanced stages, we touch only briefly on the characteristics of the two earliest stages posited by 
Piaget and his collaborators.  The first stage, Sensorimotor, generally occurs in children from 
birth to age two.  Schema learned at this level are based on behaviors and perceptions and are 
generally non-verbal.  Pre-operational children are characterized as those with formal language 
development (approximately age two), egocentrism, and a sense of the irreversibility of events.  
Reasoning at this stage is not like adult reasoning.  It is non-linear and shows a lack of 
understanding of conservation with object transformation thought to be invariant across space.   
 
As children emerge into concrete operations around age six or seven, they reflect the effect of 
social construction of knowledge and skills.  This stage is characterized by a more mature, adult-
like logic and the ability to differentiate one's own views from those of others.  Reversibility and 
an understanding of conservation (volume, mass, number, etc.) are considered common cognitive 
markers for children in this stage of development.  Reasoning is limited to concrete reality with 
physical manipulation of objects a common activity as the individual reasons through a problem. 
 Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 10, No. 3)  (Shelly & Shelly) 
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The development of formal operations is highly dependent on children's interaction with 
challenging, problem-oriented experiences and strongly reflects the social constructivism that 
characterizes cognitive development.  In this stage, logical reasoning is applied to abstract ideas 
as well as concrete representations.  The learner develops the ability to deal with abstract, 
hypothetical, and contrary-to-fact ideas and the learner is able to engage in hypothetical 
arguments and debates.  One of the most valuable skills that can develop with practice is the 
ability to think about thinking (meta-cognition). 
 
Patricia Arlin (1975) and others have posited a fifth stage of development, sometimes referred to 
as mature formal operations or heuristic operations.  An adult level of development, heuristic 
operations is characterized by holistic reasoning and more creative "left brain" problem solving.  
Sometimes this has been referred to as the "problem finding" stage.  Individuals who reach this 
stage display an ability to synthesize seemingly disparate ideas or patterns of thought to produce 
new ideas and creative outcomes. 
 
CODING SCHEMA FOR INTERACTION IN LEARNING GROUPS 
 
Coding social interaction in groups has been common practice for sociologists for over a half 
century.  Early schemes developed by Robert Bales (1950) have been refined and modified as 
technological developments have permitted more and more detailed analyses of interpersonal 
behavior (Shelly and Troyer 2001, Skvoretz, Webster, and Whitmeyer 1999).  Each of these 
coding schemes identifies an initiator of activity, the target, and classifies the activity into a 
category scheme.  Modern technology has made possible time stamping of the coding so that 
dynamics may be analyzed with greater precision than in the past.   
 
Various partitions of activity have been employed, with the most common the act.  An act is the 
expression of a socially meaningful idea either verbally or nonverbally.  Acts may include 
utterances such as "yes," "I think that is a good idea," or "let's try this approach."  When coding 
transcripts for verbal action, the units of analysis are translated from acts to clauses. While acts 
may include nonverbals such as rolling ones eyes, nods of the head, and looking away, we do not 
attempt to code this information for this analysis.  Reliability measures for these schemes are 
reported in the .75 to .90 range, depending on the detail coded and co-present training of coders. 
 
We employ a conceptually simple coding scheme developed by Berger (1958) for our analysis of 
interaction.  Action opportunities are pauses in speech, direct questions, or nonverbal glances 
directed  to another member of the group.  Performance outputs are contributions to the group 
task and efforts to organize the group for its task activity.  Reward actions are categorized as 
positive (agreements with the speaker, praise for the idea, or head nods) or negative 
(disagreements with the speaker, criticism of an idea, shaking of the head, or immediate offering 
of alternatives). 
 
Social inequality is reflected in higher rates of initiation for task contributions, more successful 
influence, and the receipt of more agreements from others for socially advantaged members of a Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 10, No. 3)  (Shelly & Shelly) 
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group.  Lower rates of task contributions, less influence, and the origination of agreements are 
characteristics associated with the disadvantaged members of groups.  This observable power 
and prestige order is one of the most robust findings in social research. 
 
CODING SCHEMA FOR COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 
 
A similar research history does not support the study of cognitive and socio-emotional 
development in human interaction.  Studies of individuals and their development suggest we 
should be able to code for conservation of number and volume, ability to reason analytically, 
evaluation of ideas, and synthesis of ideas to delineate various cognitive stages.  The coding 
scheme we have developed for this purpose is designed to differentiate individuals at the 
concrete operations level of development from those at the formal operations level.  In addition, 
we hope to be able to differentiate those at the formal operations level of development from 
those capable of heuristic operations. 
 
We expect activity by individuals at the concrete level of operations to be characterized by 
mental ordering based on a logic of classes, stated criteria, use of examples, and multiple 
dimensions.  Their explanations should employ concrete referents and give rationales based on 
them.  Action representations are specific, with concrete behaviors and directions to others. 
 
Individuals in formal operations should convey hypotheses, provide evaluations, synthesize 
material, provide problem statements, reflect on relationships, and employ combinatorial logic.  
We expect such individuals to provide rationales and criteria for hypotheses, evaluations, 
syntheses, problem statements, reflections, and combinatorial logic.  They should also provide 
criteria for hypotheses, evaluations, and syntheses.  Problem statements include originations, 
while reflections include relationship specifications. 
 
Individuals in heuristic operations should employ allegories and metaphors in their speech, 
exhibit problem finding attributes, integrate dissimilar information, and verbalize propositional 
thinking.  When using allegories and metaphors we expect such individuals to create them, react 
to and extend them when expressed by others.  Problem finding includes clear expression of the 
problem, explanation of its dimensions, and reasoning about it.  Integration of dissimilar 
information includes descriptions of the integration as well as a rationale for the proposed 
combination(s).  Propositional thinking includes descriptions of the propositions as well as a 
rationale.  A summary of the coding protocol is presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Cognitive Activity Coding 
Concrete Operations: Characterized by 
concrete and observable information or 
statements.  In each case, the content is very 
easily validated and the speaker is not using 
more abstract thinking. 
Formal Operations: Characterized by more 
abstract thinking and/or statements.  In each 
case, the content of the statement is verifiable 
through logical thinking or propositional 
thinking, 
C1  Mental Ordering or Seriation includes 
classification and the logic of classes 
using criteria, examples, and perhaps 
multiple dimensions. 
F1  Hypothesis includes a logical possible 
explanation and usually includes a 
rationale and/or criteria 
C2  Explanation (not hypotheses) includes 
concrete referent(s) and usually 
includes a rationale. 
F2  Evaluation includes an assessment of 
data, hypotheses, or thinking and 
usually includes a rationale or criteria 
for the evaluation 
C3  Action representation includes specific 
suggestions, behavioral suggestion 
for group, or directions 
F3  Synthesis includes the combining of 
hypotheses or evaluations and usually 
includes a rationale and/or criteria 
C4  Data input, Presentation of facts  F4  Problem Statement includes a clear 
reinterpretation of the problem or a 
new statement of the problem.  It is 
usually an origination statement and 
usually includes a rationale. 
  F5  Reflection includes the speaker 
feelings about or interpretation of 
earlier statements.  Relationship are 
specified and a rationale is often 
given 
  F6  Combinatorial Logic includes a the 
combining of statements into a 
proposition or a reaction to a 
proposition.  A rationale is usually 
given 
Mature Formal Operations (Heuristic 
Operations): Characterized by hypothetical 
thinking or highly abstract thinking.  In each 
case the content of the statement is clearly 
related to flow of the discussion and usually 
uses previous statements in unusual ways.  
Verification is sometimes convoluted. 
Control: This category includes statements 
and/or behaviors that are not focused on the 
content of the discussion.  They are indicative 
of social control and/or operation related 
statements. Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 10, No. 3)  (Shelly & Shelly) 
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H1  Allegory/Metaphor includes the 
creation of the allegory or metaphor 
and is often a reaction to or deeper 
understanding of the problem or task.  
The allegory is usually and extension 
of previous statements. 
Op  Operations:  Actions which move the 
group but are not substantive in 
nature 
 
 
 
H2  Problem Finding includes a clear  
expression of a problem with the 
dimensions explained and reasoning 
clarified 
Cl  Clarification: restatement, questions of 
a very specific nature requesting a 
clearer set of information 
H3  Integration of dissimilar information 
usually includes a descriptive 
statement and/or a rationale 
N  Noise: No substantive content 
H4  Propositional thinking includes a clear 
description of the proposition being 
developed and a rationale for the 
proposition 
 
 
We expect that coding interaction with these categories will allow us to determine the extent to 
which behavior of individuals may be characterized by concrete operations, formal operations, or 
heuristic operations.  This characterization is based on modal behaviors observed and the relative 
frequency of behavioral types.  The minimal unit coded for cognitive development is the turn as 
opposed to the act for measures of inequality.  The turn has been used extensively in studies of 
interaction and has proved a reliable source of information about inequality (cf. Shelly and 
Troyer 2001).  We hope to be able to develop a similar pattern for measuring cognitive 
development in interaction.  The prevalence of these behaviors will be compared to the 
prevalence of behaviors associated with social inequality to determine whether there is a 
correspondence between dynamics of inequality and cognitive development. 
 
DATA 
 
The data for this project consists of transcripts of video tapes of discussion groups from a 
doctoral seminar in Educational Leadership collected during Fall, 2003 and from a research 
project on group decision making carried out at the University of South Carolina (Smith-Lovin, 
Skvoretz, and Hudson 1986 and Smith-Lovin and Brody 1989).  The members of the seminar are 
all women, as is the instructor.  All are practicing professionals, with career lengths varying from 
fifteen to thirty-five plus years. We transcribed verbalizations for the current project and were 
able to code between twenty five and thirty minutes of interaction for each group session as one 
member of the group presented a case study for the seminar and then lead the group in discussing 
the case.  The participants knew they were being video taped and agreed to participate in the 
research project.  Four students were enrolled in the seminar.  Hence, all group sessions include 
five individuals.  The tapes are from week five of a fifteen week semester course.  Unfortunately, 
one of the tapes of a presentation and group discussion was destroyed during data preparation, so 
we have data on only three sessions. We elected to employ only the groups from the South Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 10, No. 3)  (Shelly & Shelly) 
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Carolina data that were all female in order to avoid introducing gender as a confounding factor in 
the research at this stage. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
We expect to replicate the finding that each group will evolve its own hierarchy, with the 
sessions treated as unique groups because of the shifting roles of group members across sessions.  
We expect each session to produce a rank order of interaction activity for the group members, 
such that one member talks the most, a second the second most, and so on.  We also expect that 
we will be able to reliably code activity for cognitive activity in interaction.  Our analysis will be 
exploratory to determine how activities that typically reflect social inequality and activities that 
reflect different levels of cognitive behavior (development) are related to one another. 
 
RESULTS 
 
The data from the transcripts for each group were coded by one of us and a graduate student to 
ensure that we had developed reliable coding schemes.  We compared the results of the coding to 
arrive at an assessment of reliability for each of the measures.  We found reliability to be high for 
the summary measure of task related activity when the coding by one of us (RS) was compared 
to the coding by a research assistant (r = .908, alpha = .946).  We decided not to attempt a 
reliability analysis of the cognitive content coding as our scheme is still being developed.  
Rather, we coded the transcripts independently for the cognitive activity outlined in Table 1 and 
then discussed our disagreements.  We arrived at a final consensus classification of activity for 
each speech by an actor in each group. 
 
Table 2.  Initiation of Activity in Discussion Groups. 
A.  Status differentiation: Rank Order Participation 
  Ad Hoc Groups  Seminar Groups 
Most Active  .374  .411 
Second Most Active  .202  .256 
Third Most Active  .196  .169 
Fourth Most Active  .134  .108 
Fifth Most Active  .053  .055 
Sixth Most Active  .040  .xxx 
B.  Cognitive Development Initiation Rank Order Participation: 
  Ad Hoc Groups  Seminar Groups 
Most Active  .281  .376 
Second Most Active  .199  .265 
Third Most Active  .187  .164 
Fourth Most Active  .148  .122 
Fifth Most Active  .101  .074 
Sixth Most Active  .083    xxx Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 10, No. 3)  (Shelly & Shelly) 
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Table 2 contains the relative frequency data for each of the measures of task activity and 
cognitive development activity.  Panel A contains the data for measures of inequality in groups 
and Panel B contains the data for the measures of cognitive activity.  The two sets of groups are 
presented separately for each analysis because of their difference in size and task.  First, the data 
show the pattern of status ordering one would expect in both categories of groups.  In the 
laboratory groups of undergraduates, clear status orders emerge, with a distinct hierarchical 
array.  The most active person contributes just over one third of the activity in these groups, 
while the least active contributes four percent.  A similar pattern is evident in the data for the 
classroom groups, with the most active person contributing over forty percent of total activity 
and the least active five percent.  The cognitive development measures result in a slightly 
different picture of interaction in these groups.  First, the range of percent of activity initiated by 
an actor of any rank is smaller, from eight percent to twenty-eight percent for the ad hoc groups, 
and from seven percent to thirty-seven percent for the classroom groups.  The structures in both 
groups are "flatter" employing the cognitive measures.  We think this may be either an artifact of 
coding speeches rather than acts or the consequence of patterns of cognitive development. 
 
We also compared the percent of activity initiated by members of each group categorized as 
concrete, formal, heuristic, or control.  This data is presented in Table 3.  The participants in the 
ad hoc groups and classroom groups initiate the same percent of their activity as concrete 
operations, but differ on all other types of behavior.  Participants in these classroom groups 
initiate more formal operations, more heuristic operations, and less control activity than 
participants in the ad hoc groups. 
 
Table 3.  Mean Percent of Cognitive Activity by Type of Group. 
Type of Activity  Ad Hoc Groups 
N = 18 
Seminar Groups 
N = 15  Concrete Operations [a]  .155  .214 
Formal Operations
 [b]  .089  .248 
Heuristic Operations
 [b]  .011  .035 
Control Activity
 [b]  .745  .503 
[a]  This difference is not significant 
[b]  This difference is statistically significant 
 
Table 4 contains correlation data relating status processes to levels of cognitive development in 
both categories of groups.  The small size of the samples for each type of group has limited our 
analysis to only the total set of groups.  Each correlation is based on the frequency of the various 
activities of the members who composed the groups.  First, the level of total activity is 
significantly correlated with all of the measures of cognitive development expressed in the 
various forms of verbal activity.   These correlations vary in strength from .535 to .800.  In 
addition, the level of total activity is correlated .801 with the summary measure of cognitive 
development expressed in speech.  Unfortunately, the small sample size means we cannot 
determine whether the differences between the various measures of cognitive activity are 
significant from one another. 
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Table 4.  Correlations of Total Initiated Activity with Measures of Cognitive Development 
in Speech. 
 
  Total Task Acts  Concrete 
Speech 
Formal 
Speech 
Heuristic 
Speech 
Control Actions 
Total Task Acts    .800  .633  .790  .535 
Concrete Speech      .476  .488  .509 
Formal Speech        .518  .122 
Heuristic Speech          .329 
Control Actions           
 
All correlations except .122 and .329 are significant at the p < .01 level. 
 
Of additional interest is the pattern of association between the various levels of cognitive 
behavior.  First, concrete operations behavior is moderately correlated with all of the other forms 
of developmental expression. All of these correlations are in the range where they account for 
about twenty five percent of the variation in the two measures.  Formal operations behavior is 
correlated with concrete and heuristic behaviors, but not control activity.  These measures of 
association are of approximately the same magnitude as those linking concrete operations to 
other measures of cognitive development.  Heuristic behavior is correlated with the measure of 
formal operations at approximately the same level.  Control behaviors are not correlated with 
formal or heuristic speech patterns, though they are correlated with overall activity and concrete 
operations.  This last result may be due to the greater frequency of control behavior in the ad hoc 
groups as opposed to the seminar groups. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This section includes a discussion of the status order replication, our success in coding cognitive 
behavior (development) from interaction, and the correlation between the patterns observed in 
social interaction in these contrasting task groups.  We begin with a discussion of some possible 
limitations which may affect our research.  We conclude with speculative remarks about the 
relationship between individual developmental differences and status processes. 
 
The limitations of the data we analyze are of two sorts.  One is the potential similarity or 
difference in level of cognitive development of the two different populations.  The South 
Carolina groups are composed of undergraduate students who are nineteen and twenty years old.  
We would expect their modal level of development to be Formal Operations.  The graduate 
students who compose the groups collected in Ohio are doctoral candidates with substantial 
experience who are all over thirty five years of age.  We would expect their modal level of 
development to be Heuristic Operations.  Hence, positing a range of levels of development 
across the groups is plausible. 
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The repeated use of the seminar groups raises two issues that must be addressed.  One is the 
extent to which familiarity with one another may affect the dynamics of interaction, both for 
development markers and for inequality markers.  We do not think this is a concern in this 
situation as group members rotated roles across sessions.  We expect that role assignments 
affected interaction dynamics as which individual talked the most, and with what content varied 
by the role played by the individual in the session.  The possibility that this is not the case 
presents researchers in group processes with substantial opportunities to determine the extent to 
which preexisting patterns of acquaintance may affect interaction patterns and the cognitive 
content of interaction. 
 
We turn now to the substantive outcomes of our research. 
 
First, we were able to reliably code these data for the interaction measures associated with power 
and prestige orders in interacting task groups.  Given the long history of success measuring these 
phenomena, we would have been surprised if we had not been able to do this.  We are also able 
to replicate the finding that groups assigned tasks will evolve a power and prestige order such 
that one person will talk the most, and participation by others is rank ordered.  This demonstrates 
the robust nature of this result and also provides an empirical foundation upon which to build our 
analysis of cognitive behavior in interaction. 
 
Second, we are able to code interaction for three levels of cognitive development as captured in 
the behavior in these groups. Our approach of identifying consensus classifications of concrete 
operational behaviors, formal operational behaviors, and heuristic behavior has great promise.  
The addition of social control aspects of interaction to this scheme gives us an exhaustive 
measurement procedure for classifying verbal actions in task groups. 
 
We are particularly encouraged by the empirical results we identify in these groups.  Group 
members' cognitive behaviors apparently vary by group task.  The ad hoc groups, with their 
unstructured task, spend a great deal of time engaged in social control. On the other hand, the 
seminar groups, with their more structured task, spend more time on task and less on social 
control activity.  This difference in cognitive behavior was unexpected and offers new 
opportunities for empirical investigation and theory building. We address this issue further 
below. 
 
Third, the strong correlations between cognitive behaviors and the power and prestige order of 
these groups suggests that individual development may in fact play an important role in the 
dynamic processes that govern the emergence of hierarchies in task groups.  This has profound 
implications for the use of task groups in learning settings such as classrooms.  If the dynamic 
processes which govern the emergence of power and prestige hierarchies are susceptible to 
influence by individual differences, new theory is needed to understand these processes and 
guide the use of groups in classroom settings. 
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We see three "next steps" for our research.  First, we need to improve the reliability of our 
coding scheme for cognitive behaviors.  This extension and validation exercise is critical to 
proceeding with our investigations of how individual action affects social products such as 
power and prestige processes and learning in groups.   
 
Future research needs to assess the role of the situation of action in the expression of cognitive 
behavior.  In particular, the differences in the cognitive behavior for the groups analyzed here 
suggest that population composition may be a factor in the manifestation of cognitive behaviors.  
This hypothesis is particularly intriguing since much of the research on learning groups has been 
carried out with early secondary school students.  Does the level of cognitive activity of group 
members affect the formation and maintenance of the status order in task groups is one question 
that comes immediately to mind.  Another is the extent to which the level of cognitive 
development of the individual is reflected in the content of their behavior and consequently in 
their position in the status hierarchy of the group. 
 
How tasks, and their requirements, may affect the behavior observed in a learning group is also 
an important issue that varies by situation.  In addition, assigned roles may affect the 
manifestation of cognitive behavior.  For instance, discussion leaders may exhibit more data 
presentation or problem finding, depending on their assigned roles in the group.  Similarly, 
groups may vary the amount of control activity they engage in if they face particular task 
constraints and role structures. 
 
Finally, we have not addressed the role of socio-emotional development in this report.  We 
anticipate that developing a coding scheme for this arena of investigation will be particularly 
challenging for a variety of reasons.  The scheme will require that we develop measures of both 
verbal and non-verbal behavior that can be reliably scored and that this scoring be done from 
video records. 
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